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MARYLAND'S PROMPT CRIMINAL TRIAL 
PROVISIONS: HICKS AND BEYOND 
Harold Douglas Nortont 
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly and court of ap-
peals adopted the prompt trial provisions. It was not until the 
court's 1979 decision in State v. Hicks, however, that the "teeth" 
were put into the provisions, by supplying dismissal as the sanc-
tion for violation of the defendant's rights under the prompt trial 
provisions. Since that time, there has been an abundance of liti-
gation in an attempt to clarify the applicability of the provisions 
and the sanction. In this article, the author presents a practical 
guide to the Maryland prompt trial provisions, analyzing the pro-
visions and the wealth of recent case law. 
Postponement of cases from dates scheduled for trial is 
one of the major factors contributing to delay in the adminis-
tration of justice, civil as well as criminal. Courts and court 
supporting services spend substantial time "spinning their 
wheels," in rescheduling cases. Available court time is lost. 
The time of attorneys and witnesses is lost. Witnesses them-
selves are lost. Those who are not are put in severe inconven-
ience as well as actual loss, and end up in despair at the 
frustrations of being involved in the trial of a case in the courts. 
The very image of the judicial system is in serious jeopardy. 
Public confidence in the courts as instruments of the people is 
impaired. Judges and lawyers cannot blame the "system," for 
they are the people who run that system. 
When the Legislature has expressed the will of the people 
by saying that the date established for the trial of a criminal 
case shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause, and 
has denied all judges but the administrative head of the court 
authority to exercise even that curtailed power, the message 
should be loud and clear to the bench, the bar, parties, wit-
nesses, and to the public, that trials must not and will not be 
postponed for ordinary reasons. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 25, 1979, those words written by Judge Powers rang "loud 
and clear" as the Court of Appeals of Maryland held, in State v. Hicks,2 
that the Maryland "prompt trial provisions,"3 article 27, section 591 and 
t B.A., Washington College, 1978; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, 1981; 
Associate, Brown, Brown, Brown & Waldron, Bel Air, Maryland. 
1. Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573-74, 318 A.2d 243, 248-49 (powers, J.), 
cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). 
2. 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979). 
3. For the purposes of this article, former Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983), MD. R.P. 4-271, 
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former Maryland Rule 746 were mandatory.4 The Hicks court held that 
when the trial date in a criminal case in the circuit courts is postponed 
beyond a period of 180 days from the first appearance by the defendant 
or his counsel,s the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice,6 absent a 
finding of "good cause"7 for the postponement by the hearing judge,8 or 
a waiver of the prompt trial penalty by the defendant. 9 
Since the Hicks decision, the Maryland appellate courts have been 
inundated with cases demanding further explanation of the prompt trial 
provisions and how they are to be applied. This article will outline the 
parameters of the Maryland prompt trial provisions with an eye toward 
familiarizing the practitioner with their requirements. It will discuss the 
analysis employed by the Maryland appellate courts for determining 
whether the prompt trial provisions have been satisfied, and will point 
out the pitfalls that may be encountered by both prosecution and defense 
in their efforts to comply. 
II. PROMPT TRIAL IN RETROSPECT 
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly enacted section 591 of 
article 27, which provided for trial of a criminal defendant within six 
months of personal appearance or appearance of counsel. lO Postpone-
and MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984), are referred to collectively as the 
"prompt trial provisions." By contrast, the federal and state constitutional protec-
tions are referred to collectively as the "speedy trial provisions." 
4. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 334-35,403 A.2d 356,360,369 (1979). Md. R.P. 
746 (Supp. 1983) has been stylistically reworked into MD. R.P. 4-271 without sub-
stantive change. See infra note 39 (text of rule 4-271). 
5. The time period prescribed by the prompt trial provisions stands at 180 days. MD. 
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746a (Supp. 1983); MD. R.P. 4-
271(a). See generally infra notes 10-46 and accompanying text (evolution of prompt 
trial requirements); infra Section III (mechanics of prompt trial); infra Appendix 
(prompt triaVspeedy trial diagram). 
6. See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979); see also State v. 
Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651,421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not reindict 
defendant for charges previously dismissed for prompt trial violation); Joseph, 
Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 611, 611-12 (1980). See 
generally infra Section VI (dismissal penalty). 
7. The prompt trial provisions condition postponement of a trial date on "good cause 
shown" by the requesting party. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. 
R.P. 746b (Supp. 1983); MD. R.P. 4-271 (b). See generally infra notes 10-30 and 
accompanying text (evolution of prompt trial requirements); infra Section IV(B) 
(good cause for postponement). 
8. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746b (Supp. 1983); MD. 
R.P.4-271(b). For purposes ofthis article, the county administrative judge and his 
designees are referred to collectively as hearing judges. See generally infra Section 
IV(B) (approval of postponement). 
9. See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356,369 (1979). See generally infra 
Section V (waiver of prompt trial penalty). 
10. The full text of MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (1971) read as follows: 
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a 
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of 
counselor the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal mat-
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ments under section 591 were to be made for "extraordinary cause 
shown" and by the county administrative judge only.l1 Soon thereafter, 
the court of appeals, as authorized by subsection 591(b),12 adopted for-
mer Maryland Rule 740, which incorporated section 591 by reference. 13 
Days later, in Young v. State,I4 these two expressions of legislative and 
judicial policy were held by the court of special appeals to be directory 
only,lS because no penalty had been provided for their violation. 16 The 
court pointed out, however, that the penalty of dismissal is always avail-
able to a defendant for a violation of constitutional speedy trial rights 
and that non-compliance with the state prompt trial provisions is "un-
questionably a factor" to be considered in determining if a defendant's 
rights have been violated,l1 Not until 1977, during its inspired revision 
of Chapter 700 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, did the court of 
appeals enact former Maryland Rule 746 and shorten the time in which a 
defendant must be brought to trial from six months to 120 days. IS How-
ter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the 
Circuit Court or the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in which the matter 
is pending, shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall be not 
later than six months from the date of the arraignment of the person ac-
cused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused 
whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter 
shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause shown by the mov-
ing party and only with the permission of the administrative judge of the 
court where the matter is pending. 
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized 
to establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementa-
tion of this section in the Criminal Court of Baltunore City and in the 
various circuit courts throughout the State of Maryland. 
11. [d. at § 591(a). 
12. [d. at § 591(b). 
13. The rule read that "[t]he date of trial and postponement shall be governed by code, 
Article 27, section 591," Md. R.P. 740 (1972), and was adopted by the court of 
appeals on June 1, 1972. 
14. 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 
(1972). 
15. [d. at 710, 292 A.2d at 139. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. at 710-11, 292 A.2d at 139; accord State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 36,425 A.2d 
1044, 1048 (1981); Wise v. State, 47 Md. App. 656, 675, 425 A.2d 652,663, cert. 
denied, 290 Md. 724, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Wilson V. State, 44 Md. 
App. 1, 7, 408 A.2d 102, 106 (1979), cert. denied, 286 Md. 755, cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 921 (1980). "While the rule (and presumably the statute) are considered ... 
to be nonconstitutional procedural rules . . . it is apparent from the similarity of 
purpose and sanction adopted to enforce them, that when considering the length of 
delay in bringing an accused to trial in the constitutional speedy trial context, the 
[prompt trial] time factors . . . should not have been-and cannot now-be ig-
nored." Wilson, 44 Md. App. at 7, 408 A.2d at 106. But see Hicks, 285 Md. at 320, 
403 A.2d at 361 (time limits prescribed by prompt trial provisions are not the only 
"length of delay" measure of defendants' speedy trial rights). See generally infra 
note 37 and accompanying text (availability of speedy trial protection); infra Section 
III (interplay of prompt trial and speedy trial); infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy 
trial diagram). 
18. The original text offormer Md. R.P. 746 (1979) read as follows: 
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ever, because Rule 746 was also viewed as directory, "[t]he result was 
almost wholesale violations of its provisions."19 
Finally, in State v. Hicks,20 the court of appeals "cleared the wa-
ters,"21 holding the prompt trial provisions mandatory and dismissal of 
the charges as the appropriate penalty for their violation.22 On motion 
by the state for reconsideration, the court made it clear that it intended 
to overrule Young and require mandatory dismissal. 23 The court, how-
ever, carved out two possible exceptions to the penalty of mandatory dis-
missal: (1) failure to set the trial date within 30 days of appearance,24 
and (2) "where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, 
seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746."25 
The court declared its ruling to be prospective only.26 
As noted earlier, "wholesale violations" of the prompt trial provi-
sions under their directory interpretation led the court of appeals to man-
date the "draconian sanction" of dismissal. 27 Yet the court in Hicks left 
for specUlation what type of dismissal is warranted. One commentator 
concluded that dismissal should be absolute, or at least presumed abso-
a. General Provision. 
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first 
appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723 (Ap-
pearance-Provision for or Waiver of Counsel), a trial date shall be set 
which shall be not later than 120 days after the appearance or waiver of 
counselor after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to 
Rule 723 (Appearance-Provision for or Waiver of Counsel). 
b. Change of Trial Date. 
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for ex-
traordinary cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge desig-
nated by him may grant a change of trial date. 
19. State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33,425 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1981). 
20. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). 
21. State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1981). 
22. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). "Although, to be 
precise, Hicks' holding referred to the 120-day Rule, the holding has been applied 
with equal force to the Rule as amended." Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 180 
n.2, 426 A.2d 415,421 n.2 (1981). See supra note 18 (text of former Md. R.P. 746). 
23. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334-35,403 A.2d 356, 370 (1979). 
24. Id. at 335, 403 A.2d at 369. See generally infra Section IV (initial setting of a trial 
date). 
25. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979). See generally infra 
Section V (waiver of prompt trial provisions). 
26. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 368-69 (1979). For examples of 
application of the Hicks rule see, e.g., State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 31-35,425 
A.2d 1044, 1047-48 (1980); Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 634, 421 A.2d 85, 
87 (1980), affd per curiam, 290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Chance v. State, 45 
Md. App. 521, 525, 414 A.2d 535, 536 (1980); Gasque v. State, 45 Md. App. 471, 
478, 413 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1980); Leuschner v. State, 45 Md. App. 323, 357, 413 
A.2d 227, 246, cert. denied, 288 Md. 739 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 1014 (1981); 
State V. Hiken, 43 Md. App. 259, 271, 405 A.2d 284, 291 (1979). 
27. Joseph, supra note 6, at 619 (quoting United States V. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 852 
(D.C. Cir. 1975»; see State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979); 
State V. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33, 425 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1981). 
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lute, as it is with speedy trial violations,28 because "[t]he announced in-
tention of the Hicks court to put 'teeth' into the [prompt trial provisions] 
would be rendered largely negatory were the State permitted to recom-
mence prosecution after an illegal delay."29 This question has been laid 
to rest by State v. Armstrong,30 in which the court of special appeals held 
that prosecution of charges dismissed for prompt trial violations is im-
permissible under both prompt and speedy trial analysis. 3 1 Charges dis-
missed for substantive deficiencies, however, may be refiled, causing the 
l80-day period to begin anew,32 as may be charges that are entered nolle 
prosequi, unless the purpose or effect of such entry is to circumvent 
prompt trial requirements. 33 
Because of the concern expressed by the bench and prosecutorial bar 
over the cataclysmic effect that Hicks might have on the criminal justice 
system,34 the time period offormer Rule 746 was increased to 180 days,3S 
and the extraordinary cause condition was demoted to good cause in both 
the rule36 and statute.37 The rule is presently designated as Rule 4-271 
28. Loker, The Effect of State v. Hicks on the Scheduling & Postponement of Trials 
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 746, 2 MARYLAND PROSECUTOR 29, 30 (1979); see 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-41 (1973). 
29. Loker, supra note 28, at 30; see also State v. Annstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651, 421 
A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (defendant may not be retried for charges dismissed for prompt 
trial violation); Joseph, supra note 6, at 641 (authority split on this issue). 
30. 46 Md. App. 641, 421 A.2d 98 (1980). 
31. Id. at 651, 421 A.2d at 104; see also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-41 
(1973) (federal Constitution). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 611-12 (dismis-
sal with prejudice is typical penalty under most state speedy or prompt trial 
schemes); Rubine, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Deals, 57 CORNELL 
L. REv. 794, 811-12 (1971-72) (dismissal with prejudice necessary to compel com-
pliance with state's duty to try defendant promptly). 
32. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984); Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983); 
MD. R.P. 4-271(a). 
33. Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 462, 474 A.2d 502, 508 (1984); State v. Glenn, 299 
Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984). 
34. See State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1981); see also Note, 
Criminal Procedure-Maryland Rule 746--Scheduling Criminal Cases for Trial-
Maryland Rule 746 Requires That Criminal Charges be Dismissed When State Fails 
to Bring Case to Trial Within Prescribed Period and Fails to Establish Extraordinary 
Cause Justifying Postponement. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), 9 
U. BALT. L. REv. 473,489-92 (1980) (effect of Hicks on judicial system). 
35. Court of Appeals of Md., Rules Order of Nov. 16, 1979,6 Md. Admin. Reg. 1915 
(1979). See generally State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 
(1981); Note, supra note 34, at 490-91. 
36. Court of Appeals of Md., Rules Order of July 3, 1980, 7 Md. Admin. Reg. 1414 
(1980). See generally State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 
(1981) (evolution of prompt trial rule); Note, supra note 34, at 492. 
37. Act of May 6, 1980, ch. 378, 1980 Md. Laws 1283. The statutory two week period 
for scheduling the initial trial date, however, has been pre-empted by the rule. State 
v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). MD. R.P. 4-271 only 
changes fonner Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983) stylistically and adds the district court 
counterpart, MD. DIST. RULE 746, to subsection (c) for organizational purposes. 
See infra note 38 (text of MD. R.P. 4-271). The text of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 591 (Supp. 1984) now reads as follows: 
§ 591. Setting date for trial; postponement. 
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and is virtually identical to former Rule 746.38 
In order to understand decisions involving prompt trial issues, the 
public policy considerations voiced by the court in Hicks must be consid-
ered. The Hicks court was careful to distinguish nonconstitutional 
prompt trial from constitutional speedy trial, and explained that the state 
prompt trial provisions were enacted to minimize the societal effects of 
excessive delay in the criminal justice system rather than the effects of 
such delay on an individual defendant.39 The court stated that by adopt-
ing the rule it intended to "put teeth into a new regulation governing the 
assignment of criminal cases for trial. . . ."40 In Hicks, the defendant's 
incarceration in another jurisdiction on the scheduled trial date 
amounted to extraordinary cause for postponement.41 The court stated, 
however, that 
in so concluding, we intend no departure from the established 
law that the mere fact that defendant is incarcerated in another 
jurisdiction does not relieve the State of its Sixth Amendment 
obligation to grant the accused his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial .... The time limits prescribed by Rule 746 are 
not, however, the measure of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial. While the rule was adopted to facilitate the 
prompt disposition of criminal cases, it stands on a different 
legal footing than the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to 
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a 
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of 
counselor the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal mat-
ter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the 
circuit court in which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of 
the case, which date shall be not later than 180 days from the date of the 
arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment 
of counsel for the accused whichever occurs first. The date established for 
the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown 
by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative 
judge of the court where the matter is pending. 
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized to 
establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation 
of this section in the various circuit courts throughout the State of 
Maryland. 
38. Rule 4-271. TRIAL DATE. 
(a) Trial Date in Circuit Court.-The date for trial in the circuit 
court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of 
counselor the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court 
pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the 
earlier of those events. On motion of a party, or on the court's initiative, 
and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that judge's 
designee may grant a change of a circuit court trial date. 
(b) Change of Trial Date in District Court.-The date for trial in 
the District Court may be changed on motion of a party and for good 
cause shown. 
39. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316,403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979). 
40. [d. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. 
41. [d. at 318-20, 403 A.2d at 360-61. 
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a speedy trial. 42 
Thus, although the sixth amendment grants to a defendant a "per-
sonal" right to speedy trial,43 "[t]he purpose of [the prompt trial provi-
sions], which require an accused to be tried within [180] days of his or his 
attorney's appearance [are] to protect society's interest in an effective 
criminal justice system."44 As will be evident throughout this article, it 
is crucial that practitioners be familiar with the difference between the 
constitutional speedy trial right and the nonconstitutional prompt trial 
provisions.4s 
42. Id. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361-62 (emphasis added); see Note, supra note 34, at 487-89. 
But see supra note 17 and accompanying text (prompt trial period used as guage of 
speedy trial delay factor). 
43. u.s. CoNST. amend. VI (right of "accused" to speedy trial); see State v. Lattisaw,48 
Md. App. 20, 29, 425 A.2d 1051, 1056 (speedy trial right is personal), cert. denied, 
290 Md. 717 (1981). 
44. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 321,403 A.2d 356, 362 (1979) (Davidson, J., dissent-
ing); see, e.g., Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 142,461 A.2d 543, 546-67 (1983) 
(prompt trial provisions promote efficiency), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 
458 (1984); Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 229,458 A.2d 480,484 (1983) (good 
cause where movant exercised diligence and "need to postpone outweighs the detri-
ment to the public interest from delay"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. 
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). See generally infra Section IV(B) (good 
cause for postponement). 
45. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... " 
Because this right is viewed as "fundamental," it applies to the several states by 
operation of the fourteenth amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 
213, 223 (1967); see also MD. CONST. art. 21, which reads: 
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of 
the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in 
due time (if required) to prepare for his defense; to be allowed counsel; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his wit-
nesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a 
speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he 
ought not to be found guilty. 
"[O]pinions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial are 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,' as to the 
proper construction of Maryland's parallel Article 21 right." Smith v. State, 276 
Md. 521, 527, 350 A.2d 628,632 (1976); see also Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 545-46, 
350 A.2d 640, 642-43 (1976) (discussion of sixth amendment deemed equally appli-
cable to Declaration of Rights, Art. 21 for purposes of decision). 
Although there may be many sources of speedy and prompt trial rights, the 
federal Constitutional right looms over the entire criminal litigation and, when all 
else fails, "provides ultimate speedy trial protection; irrespective of extraconstitu-
tional, or even state constitutional, protections .... " Joseph, supra note 6, at 642. 
See generally infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy trial diagram). 
Despite its broad reach, the sixth amendment "provides only a minimum stan-
dard of protection," as applied, and states are free to provide more protection than 
the federal right by statute, rule, or common law. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 614; 
Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 545-46, 350 A.2d 640, 642-43 (1976) (state court need 
not always follow the lead of the Supreme Court, but may accord greater individual 
rights). 
The Maryland prompt trial provisions are extraconstitutional in nature, and 
the Hicks majority was quick to point out the mutual exclusivity of speedy trial and 
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Another source of confusion stems from the use of terms "postpone-
ment" and "continuance. "46 Postponement refers to the rescheduling of 
the trial date before commencement of the trial; continuance refers to 
rescheduling within the trial itself. As will be evident throughout this 
article, this is an important distinction. 
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE PROMPT TRIAL PROVISIONS 
A proper starting point for determining if the prompt trial provi-
prompt trial rights. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320,403 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1979). 
Therefore, the 18O-day period is not the measure of a defendant's speedy trial right, 
but is more restrictive than the constitutional provision. Note, supra note 34, at 
488-89. But see supra note 17 and accompanying text (l80-day period used as 
benchmark in speedy trial analysis). Similarly, the speedy trial balancing test is not 
the balancing test for prompt trial. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 
487,490, cerro denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983). Theoretically, a defendant may request 
postponement for good cause under prompt trial analysis and, in the same breath, 
demand a speedy trial. 
Because the penalty for prompt trial violations is dismissal with prejudice, a 
finding for the defendant will ordinarily render the constitutional speedy trial issue 
moot. If, however, there is no prompt trial violation, a separate constitutional 
speedy trial analysis is required to determine whether the charges should be dis-
missed. See, e.g., Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. 
Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 472 A.2d 465 (1984); Satchell V. State,-54 Md. App. 333,458 
A.2d 853 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 42, 472 A.2d 457 (1984); see also Joseph, supra note 
6, at 616; Note, supra note 34, at 487-89 (demarcation between constitutional and 
extraconstitutional speedy trial rights). 
Because, however, the prompt trial provisions may allow postponement of the 
trial date beyond a period of time that may be constitutionally significant, that the 
defendant's prompt trial rights have not been violated does not mean that his speedy 
trial rights have not been abridged. Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 
(1984); Joseph, supra note 6, at 618; see Note, supra note 34, at 487-89. Therefore, 
the administrative judge or his designee should see that the postponement is not 
extended for an unconstitutional length of time. See, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. 
App. 124, 133 n.5, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.5, affd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); 
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 231, 458 A.2d 480, 485 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984); State v. Green, 
54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 
(1984). See generally infra Section IV(C) (approval of postponements). 
Like most other states, Maryland has adopted the balancing test set forth in 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as a guide to determine violations of speedy 
trial rights. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 306, 295 A.2d 779 (1972); see R. 
GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 42.3 (1983); see Comment, The Right to a Speedy Trial in Maryland, 6 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 47, 54-55 (1976) (balancing test analysis); Joseph, supra note 6, at 
613 (balancing test analysis and its wide acceptance). 
Four factors are to be weighed in this process. They are (1) length of delay; 
(2) reason for delay; (3) prejudice to the accused; and (4) waiver of speedy trial 
penalty by the accused. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see Comment, 
supra, at 50-67; R. GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., supra, at § 42.3-42.8. Once delay 
moves the trial date to beyond a constitutionally significant period, both speedy and 
prompt trial rights may be asserted. See Note, supra note 34, at 487-89. See gener-
ally infra Section VI (motion to dismiss); infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy trial 
diagram). 
46. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 130-32, 458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
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sions apply to a particular case is Maryland Rule 4-271(a), which exclu-
sively applies the prompt trial provisions to criminal cases being tried in 
the circuit courtS.47 Thus, the mandatory dismissal penalty does not ap-
ply to cases brought and tried in the District Court of Maryland.48 
Moreover, when a defendant is first charged in the district court but is 
later indicted in the circuit court, time spent at the district court level is 
not part of the 180-day period.49 
The prompt trial provisions may also be defined by their excep-
tions.so For example, they do not apply to delay between arrest and ini-
tial appearance in the circuit court. sl Nor do they apply once a trial date 
is postponed beyond 180 days for good cause shown. Once a trial date is 
properly postponed beyond that limit, a defendant's rights are protected 
only by the constitutional speedy trial provisions. 52 The same is true 
once trial has begun: "except as limited by statute or rule, a trial court 
has inherent authority to control its own docket,"s3 and the prompt trial 
provisions do not limit this authority. 54 Thus, the trial judge may grant a 
continuance so long as it does not violate the defendant's constitutional 
47. The text of MD. R.P. 4-271 is set out supra note 38. It is clear that subsection (a) of 
the rule does not affect subsection (b), which concerns change of trial date in the 
district court only, and is a virtual replica of former Maryland District Rule 746. 
Former Rule 746 refers to Md. R.P. 723 (1983) (appearance), also a circuit court 
rule. See Scott v. State, 49 Md. App. 70, 86,430 A.2d 615, 623, cert. denied, 291 
Md. 781 (1981); see also MD. R.P. 4-271 (trial date) (reference to MD. R.P. 4-213 
(appearance». 
48. E.g., Scott v. State, 49 Md. App. 70, 86,430 A.2d 615, 623, cert. denied, 291 Md. 
781 (1981). 
49. Where a district court proceeding is terminated and the state seeks an indictment by 
way of grand jury, "[t]here is no provision for tacking the time between the District 
Court charge and a subsequent grand jury indictment to the time that begins run-
ning under the rule in the Circuit Court." Pearson V. State, 53 Md. App. 217, 219-
20, 452 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1982). There is a split of authority on this point in other 
jurisdictions. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 641. But cf State V. Armstrong, 46 Md. 
App. 641, 651, 421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not reindict defendant on 
charges dismissed under prompt trial provisions). 
50. See State V. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). 
51. E.g., Pearson V. State, 53 Md. App. 217, 219-20, 452 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1982). Such 
inquiry "would raise difficult problems of proof." Rubine, supra note 31, at 806 
n.58 (quoting ABA Standards § 2.2(a), Comment at 23 (1972». 
52. See, e.g., State V. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 467-68, 474 A.2d 509, 511 (1984); Farinholt 
V. State, 299 Md. 43, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State V. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 439-40, 
463,470 A.2d 1269, 1278, 1290-91 (1984); State V. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65, 
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), afJ'd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally 
supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial and speedy trial 
provisions). 
53. Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982); see, e.g., Mitchell v. 
State, 56 Md. App. 162, 178-80,467 A.2d 522,530-31 (1983); Roberts v. State, 53 
Md. App. 236, 258, 452 A.2d 1271, 1272 (1982); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 
562,573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally 
Joseph, supra note 6, at 643-44 (contours of "trial" suggested); infra note 161 and 
accompanying text (powers of trial judge in prompt trial context). 
54. Guarnera V. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied, 
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 and accompanying text (powers of 
trial judge in prompt trial context). 
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right to speedy trial or to due process,55 and any further delay is of con-
cern under prompt trial analysis. 56 As will be discussed later, although 
the prompt trial provisions apply to approval of postponement by the 
hearing judge to a date within the 180-day period,57 the dismissal penalty 
does not, regardless of the existence of good cause. 58 
Because the prompt trial provisions are limited by their own terms, 
it may be helpful to restate their facial requirements as follows: 
1) a trial date must be assigned within 30 days from appear-
ance of the defendant or his counsel;59 
2) the trial must be set for a date within 180 days;60 
3) a change of the trial date may be made by the hearing 
judge for good cause shown.61 
Under Hicks, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate penalty for fail-
ure to begin the trial within 180 days without good cause or waiver,62 but 
there is no prompt trial penalty for an initial failure to assign a trial date 
within 30 days.63 There is no prompt trial penalty for postponement 
55. State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 573,414 A.2d 240, 242 (1980). 
56. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129,458 A.2d 442,446 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 
32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). The speedy trial provisions do, however, apply to such 
delay. See, e.g., State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59,472 A.2d 465 (1984); Farinholt v. 
State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65, 
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally 
supra notes 17 and 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial and speedy 
trial). 
57. E.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v. 
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32,472 
A.2d 452 (1984). See generally infra Section IV (postponement to date within 180-
day period); infra Section IV(C) (approval of postponement). 
58. E.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v. 
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442, 446, 448 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32, 
472 A.2d 452 (1984). See infra note 63 and accompanying text (such delay may 
have speedy trial implications). 
59. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591(a) (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746(a) (Supp. 1983); MD. 
R.P. 4-271(a). See generally infra Section IV (postponement to date within 180-day 
period). 
60. [d. 
61. [d. See generally infra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement); infra Section 
IV(C) (approval of postponement). 
62. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 334-35,403 A.2d 356, 360, 369 (1979); see, e.g., 
State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651,421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not 
reindict defendant on charges previously dismissed for failure to comply with 
prompt trial provisions). See generally infra Section V (waiver of sanction). 
"Although more modern speedy trial plans differ in details, certain common charac-
teristics can be identified, including the setting of time limits, provisions for exten-
sion of the time limits, and sanctions for failure to comply." Rubine, supra note 31, 
at 803. 
63. Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459,462 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 
Md. App. 124,133,458 A.2d 442,448,449 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 
(1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 261 n.2, 458 A.2d 487, 488 n.2 (1983), 
affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). "As long as the trial is begun within the 
180-day limit, any delay in its commencement is irrelevant for purposes of the 
[prompt trial] rule." Farinholt, 54 Md. App. at 129,458 A.2d at 446. The speedy 
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within 180 days regardless of good cause,64 and, therefore, such post-
ponement is permissible. 
Unlike the constitutional speedy trial right, the prompt trial provi-
sions do not apply to retrial after remand from an appellate court.6S 
Also, where no trial is contemplated by the parties, as in the taking of a 
plea of guilty, the defendant cannot be heard to complain simply because 
this was not accomplished within 180 days.66 In other words, " 'a plea of 
guilty, effectively accepted, waives all procedural objections, constitu-
tional or otherwise and all non-jurisdictional defects.' "67 
Finally, it should be noted that, while the prompt trial provisions 
vest the hearing judge with the exclusive power to postpone, "[t]his does 
not mean that every request for a postponement of the date set for trial in 
a criminal case must be acted upon by the [hearing] judge. "68 The trial 
judge may, in his discretion, deny a request for postponement69 but he 
may not grant postponement for approval by the hearing judge after the 
expiration of the 180 day period.70 
trial provisions, however, do apply, and that delay may be relevant to speedy trial 
analysis. Green, 54 Md. App. at 264-65, 458 A.2d at 490. See generally 9 U. BALT. 
L. REv. 473, 485-89 (comparison between prompt trial and constitutional speedy 
trial requirements); supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial 
and speedy trial); infra Section IV (postponement of trial date); infra Appendix 
(prompt trial/speedy trial diagram). 
64. See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979); MD. R.P. 4-271(a). 
65. Coleman v. State, 49 Md. App. 210, 219-20, 431 A.2d 696, 701 (1981); Donalds v. 
State, 49 Md. App. 106, 108-09,430 A.2d 113, 115, affd per curiam, 291 Md. 276, 
434 A.2d 581 (1981); see State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 38, 425 A.2d 1044, 1049 
(1981), wherein the court stated: 
[T]he fact of the matter is that Rule 746 and Art. 27, § 591 do not cover 
this situation. The striking of the guilty plea here may be likened to the 
grant of a new trial by a trial court or a remand for a new trial by an 
appellate court. Neither the rule nor the statute prescribes within what 
period the trial shall be had in such circumstances; it is the first bringing of 
an accused to trial that is contemplated by both of them. 
[d. (dictum); cf. Ward v. State, 52 Md. App. 63, 77-79, 447 A.2d 872, 877-80 
(prompt trial right not violated where trial delayed as a result of defendant's at-
tempts to reverse), cert. denied, 294 Md. 546,451 A.2d 657 (1982); Collins v. State, 
52 Md. App. 186, 193-95,447 A.2d 1272, 1277 (1982) (180-day rule does not apply 
to retrial), affd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). The weight of authority is 
that a defendant's constitutional right to prompt trial is "revived" by a mistrial. 
Joseph, supra note 6, at 633-34. 
66. Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 183,426 A.2d 415, 423 (1981); cf. MD. Crs. & 
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(e) (Repl. Vol. 1984) (appeal following guilty plea 
by leave of court of special appeals only). 
67. [d. (quoting English v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 443,298 A.2d 464, 467 (1973». See 
generally infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial sanction). 
68. Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243,248 n.l, cert. denied, 
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 (powers of trial judge in prompt 
trial litigation). 
69. Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied, 
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 (powers of trial judge in prompt 
trial litigation). 
70. Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984). See generally infra note 161 
(powers of trial judge in prompt trial litigation). 
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Another consideration is the determination of when the rule takes 
effect. Revised Maryland Rule 4-271(a) requires that, once a criminal 
defendant appears in court, alone or through counsel pursuant to Re-
vised Maryland Rule 4-213, the court has 30 days in which to assign a 
trial date for within 180 days of appearance. This determination may be 
affected by other factors, such as in a case in which the state enters a 
nolle prosequi and the charges are later reinstituted.71 As a general rule, 
"separate charging documents have separate lives and exist independent 
of each other."72 But as the court of appeals held in Curley v. State,73 
[w]hen a circuit court criminal case is nol prossed, and the state 
later has the same charges refiled, the 180 day period for trial 
prescribed by [the prompt trial provisions] ordinarily begins to 
run with the arraignment or first appearance of defense counsel 
under the second prosecution. If, however, it is shown that the 
nol pros had the purpose or effect of circumventing the require-
ments of [the prompt trial provisions], the 180 day period will 
commence to run with the arraignment or first appearance of 
counsel under the first prosecution.74 
The court held that when a case is nol prossed to circumvent the prompt 
trial provisions, and the second prosecution is instituted after the expira-
tion of the 180-day period for the first prosecution, the time period begins 
for the second prosecution to run on the same date as it had for the first 
prosecution.7s The period begins to run on commencement of the second 
presecution, however, if the case has been nol prossed merely for the 
purpose of correcting a substantive error in the document.76 Along simi-
lar lines, when a charging document is dismissed on motion by the de-
fendant for substantive deficiencies, and a new document is filed before 
the original expiration date, the court has held that the period begins to 
run on the second prosecution.77 
IV. POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL DATE 
Any party78 seeking to postpone a criminal case in a circuit court to 
a date either within or beyond the 180-day period must satisfy the follow-
ing three conditions:79 (1) request postponement from the hearing 
71. See MD. R.P. 4-247. 
72. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 470, 474 A.2d 512, 513 (1984). 
73. 299 Md. 449, 474 A.2d 502 (1984). 
74. Id. at 462, 474 A.2d at 508. 
75.Id. 
76. State v. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984). 
77. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984). 
78. "The mere use of the word 'party' in [the prompt trial provisions] does not preclude 
a motion by the court sua sponte as long as the requisite cause and action by the 
administrative judge are present." Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110,442 A.2d 550, 
557 (1982) (decided under former Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983»; see MD. R.P. 4-271 
(trial court may move for postponement). 
79. These steps were outlined in Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 112, 442 A.2d 550, 558 
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judge;80 (2) show good cause for the postponement;81 (3) gain approval of 
the postponement from the hearing judge.82 There is no prompt trial 
penalty for failure to satisfy these conditions when securing a postpone-
ment within the ISO-day period.83 Because unjustified delay caused by 
rescheduling a trial date may cause constitutional speedy trial problems84 
and prompt trial problems,85 every effort should be made to postpone to 
within a reasonable time, preferably within the ISO-day period. Simi-
larly, although the prompt trial provisions do not apply once trial is be-
gun within the ISO-day period, any continuance must be justified as an 
exercise of sound discretion and must withstand constitutional speedy 
trial scrutiny.86 As a caveat, regardless of whether these conditions are 
satisfied, a defendant may waive his right to the prompt trial penalty 
personally or through counsel. 87 
A. Request for Postponement of Trial 
A request for postponement of the trial date is a form of motion88 
(1982). See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129, 134-35,458 A.2d 442,446-
48, (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Although Goins speaks of these 
conditions as necessary to gain postponement beyond the 18O-day period, the court 
of special appeals noted in Farinholt that "[t]he one seeking postponement [within 
180-days] must still comply with section b of the Rule and establish good cause for 
the postponement before the administrative judge or his designee." Farinholt, 54 
Md. App. at 133, 458 A.2d at 448. Logically, it should make no difference since 
swift and effective justice is the ultimate social and legal goal, and "[o]ne of the 
purposes of [the prompt trial provisions] is to give the county administrative judge 
control over the administration of dockets." State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983) (citing Hicks v. State, 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979», 
affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). 
80. See infra Section IV(B) (request for postponement). 
81. See infra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement). 
82. See infra Section IV(B) (approval of postponement). 
83. See, e.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v. 
Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 261 n.2, 458 A.2d 487, 488 n.2 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72, 
472 A.2d 472 (1984). "When postponements are granted from one date within the 
180-day period to another date also within the 180-day period, the Hicks sanction of 
dismissal under Rule 746a is inapplicable. . . . The dismissal sanction authorized 
by Hicks for a violation of Rule 746. . . applies only when a postponement causes a 
trial to be continued to a date beyond the 18O-day limit without good cause." State 
v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442,448 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32, 
472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
84. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232, 458 A.2d 480,486 (1983), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). See 
generally supra notes 17 and 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial 
and speedy trial rights). 
85. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 446-48, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282-83 (1984); State v. 
Brown, 61 Md. App. 411, 486 A.2d 813 (1985). 
86. See supra note 83. 
87. See infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial sanction). 
88. Compare Md. R.P. 736(c) (1977) ("other motions" must be "filed") and MD. R.P. 
4-252(b) with Md. R.P. 746(b) (Supp. 1983) (request for postponement may be made 
"[u]pon motion of a party made in writing or in open court") and MD. R.P. 4-
271(a) (change of trial date on motion of party or court). Clearly, Md. R.P. 746 and 
MD. R.P. 4-271 are self-governing. 
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that may be made by the state,89 the defendant,90 a codefendant,91 or the 
trial court.92 Although the request may be oral,93 the better practice is to 
make the request and the reasons therefore in writing94 so that they 
become a part of the record.9S Although the request should be express 
and articulate,96 it may be made "by the requesting party's seeking some 
type of relief which by necessity requires the granting of a postponement 
"97 
89. E.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 360-61 (1979); Calhoun v. 
State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522,451 A.2d 146, 149 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 299 
Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a). 
90. E.g., Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983), cert. denied, 
298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458 
A.2d 442, 449 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); Meyer v. State, 49 
Md. App. 300, 301,431 A.2d 738, 740-41, cert. denied, 291 Md. 782 (1981). 
91. McFadden v. State, 299 Md. 55, 58,472 A.2d 463,465 (1984) (per curiam); Satchell 
v. State, 299 Md. 42, 46, 472 A.2d 457, 459 (1984). 
92. E.g., Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 488, 474 A.2d 517, 522 (1984); Goins v. State, 
48 Md. App. 115, 117-18,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981) (trial date implicitly extended 
by extension of time to file report), affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982); see 
Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982) (dictum) (trial court 
could have obtained postponement); see also Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110, 442 
A.2d 550, 557 (1982) (hearing judge may be "party" under prompt trial provisions); 
MD. R.? 4-271(a). 
93. See, e.g., Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 71, 472 A.2d 470, 471 (1984); Pennington v. 
State, 299 Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447,449 (1984); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,21,472 
A.2d 444, 446 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458 A.2d 442, 449 
(1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
94. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.6, affd, 299 
Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Although the prompt trial provisions do not incorpo-
rate a demand requirement, a defendant, as an act of good faith, may file a "motion 
to compel compliance with the 180-day rule." Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 
538, 544, 454 A.2d 879, 882 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 
447 (1984). A motion for speedy trial or for prompt trial without a properly filed 
motion to dismiss for lack of speedy or prompt trial, however, ordinarily waives 
appellate review of the speedy or prompt trial issue. See Md. R.P. 1085 (1977) 
(scope of review of court of special appeals); Md. R.P. 885 (1977) (scope of review 
of court of appeals); see also Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l, 454 
A.2d 879, 881 n.l (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984) 
(waiver of speedy trial issue). 
95. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 221, 421 A.2d 69,72 (1980) (record showed 
sufficient request); Meyer v. State, 49 Md. App. 300, 301-02, 431 A.2d 738, 739, 
cert. denied, 291 Md. 782 (1981) (letter expressing dissatisfaction with counsel made 
part of record). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving 
request on record). 
96. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.6 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying 
text (preserving request on record). 
97. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458 A.2d 442,449 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 
32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); see, e.g., Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 474 A.2d 517 
(1984) (motion to suppress); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444 (1984) (order 
for psychiatric examination); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318-19, 403 A.2d 356, 
360-61 (1979) (excusable inability by state to deliver defendant on trial date); Monge 
v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983) (request by defendant for 
delay in electing mode of trial), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984); 
Briscoe V. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83,426 A.2d 415,422-23 (1981) (request for 
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For example, in Monge v. State,98 a motion by the defendant for an 
extension of time "to file an election of court or jury trial until his return 
from Perkins" was held to amount to "seeking or expressly consenting to 
a violation of [the prompt trial provisions]."99 Similarly, in State v. 
Hicks,IOO the court of appeals held that the prosecutor's representation to 
the hearing judge that the defendant was incarcerated in another jurisdic-
tion and could not be back in the state for trial until the next month was 
"tantamount" to having requested a postponement. 101 In Goins v. 
State,102 the trial judge was held to have granted a postponement on his 
own motion, for the purposes of the prompt trial provisions, when he 
gave Clifton T. Perkins Hospital extra time in which to evaluate a de-
fendant,103 and in Carey v. State,l04 an order by the county administra-
tive judge for the defendant's mental exam was held to be a sua sponte 
postponement. lOS 
B. Good Cause for Postponement 
At the heart of the prompt trial provisions lies the condition that 
postponement of trial date be granted only for good cause shown. 106 Ac-
cording to the court of appeals in Hicks, "[d]etennining what constitutes 
'[good] cause' under [the prompt trial provisions] is, of course, dependent 
upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 107 Because the prompt 
provisions were enacted "to protect the societal interest in the prompt 
trial of criminal cases ... ,"108 the term "good cause" is simply a mea-
suring device lO9 used to achieve this goal. I 10 
Although the prompt trial provisions remove the discretionary 
power to postpone from the trial judge and vest it in the hearing judge, III 
the essential criteria for postponement remain the same. 112 What began 
removal); Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 121,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981), affd, 
293 Md. 97, 110-12,442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982) (request of psychiatric hospital for 
extra time to evaluate defendant). Cf infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial pen-
alty). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 627-29 (consent/waiver). 
98. 55 Md. App. 72, 461 A.2d 21 (1983). 
99. Id. at 79-80, 461 A.2d at 26. 
100. 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979). 
101. Id. at 318-19, 403 A.2d at 360-61. 
102. 48 Md. App. 115, 425 A.2d 1374 (1981), affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982). 
103. Id. at 121,425 A.2d at 1378. 
104. 299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444 (1984). 
105. Id. at 21-22, 472 A.2d at 447. 
106. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 591(a) (Supp. 1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746 
(Supp. 1983). 
107. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319,403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
108. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480, 483 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). 
109. Id. at 229, 458 A.2d at 484. 
110. Id. passim; State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 315-20,403 A.2d 356, 359-61 (1979) (ex-
traordinary cause); Note, supra note 34, at 477-79 (1980) (extraordinary cause). 
Ill. See MD. R.P. 4-271; Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983); see also State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 
422, 449-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984). 
112. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (good cause), affd, 299 
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as a test of "ordinary discretion," 1 13 became one of "extraordinary 
cause,"114 and is now one of "good cause."115 "The change to 'good 
cause' may affect the balance, but does not change the essential require-
ment that the need to postpone outweigh the detriment to the public 
interest."116 The result is a private need/public interest test, which pro-
vides that good cause exists "if the moving party, including the court, has 
exercised reasonable diligence in trying to avoid the need to postpone and 
the need to postpone outweighs the detriment to the public interest from 
delay."117 This is essentially a balancing test that must be employed by 
the hearing judge,118 and generally, the hearing judge may not be over-
ruled by the trial judge119 or an appellate court120 absent a clear showing 
of abuse of discretion. 121 
It should be noted that, because the former test was more demand-
ing, those cases decided before the change to good cause that found "ex-
traordinary cause" for postponement will only be persuasive under the 
new standard. 122 Similarly, although the ISO-day period under prompt 
trial analysis is not meant to be the measure of the "length of the delay" 
Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 572-73, 318 
A.2d 243, 248 (extraordinary cause), cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). See gener-
ally infra Section IV(B) (approval of postponement). 
113. See Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480,483 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 574 (1984) (prompt trial 
provisions strip trial judges of discretionary power to postpone). 
114. E.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979); Copeland v. State, 27 Md. 
App. 397, 340 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740, 750 (1975); Bethea v. State, 26 
Md. App. 398, 338 A.2d 390 (1975); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 
243, cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). These cases remain persuasive. See State v. 
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 132 n.4, 458 A.2d 442, 448 n.4 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 
32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text 
(development of prompt trial provisions). 
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746(b) 
(Supp. 1983). See generally supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text (development 
of prompt trial provisions). 
116. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 230, 458 A.2d 480, 485 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). 
117. Carter, 54 Md. App. at 229, 458 A.2d at 484. 
118. Id.; see also Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 574, 318 A.2d 243, 249 (pre-
Hicks; delay must be unforeseen and unintentional), cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 
(1974); c/ State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487, 490, affd, 299 Md. 
72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984) (speedy trial balancing test inapplicable to prompt trial). 
119. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 488, 474 A.2d 514, 517 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 
Md. 422, 448-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 
265-67, 458 A.2d 487, 490-91, affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984); see infra 
Section IV(B) (approval of postponement). 
120. See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 450-52, 470 A.2d 1269, 1284-85 (1984); State v. 
Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 266-67, 458 A.2d 487,491, affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 
472 (1984). 
121. See State v. Beard, 299 Md. 272, 280, 474 A.2d 514, 517 (1984); State v. Frazier, 
298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 266-68,458 
A.2d 487, 490-92, affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). 
122. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 132 n.4, 458 A.2d 442, 448 n.4 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
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factor in constitutional speedy trial litigation,123 the "reason for delay" 
factor under constitutional speedy trial analysis may be helpful in deter-
mining what constitutes good cause in prompt trial litigation. 124 
The Maryland appellate court decisions to date offer some specific 
but non-definitive examples of good cause shown, and many of these in-
volve pretrial preparation or motions. For example, a delay in receiving 
an evaluation concerning the defendant's mental health was held to be 
good cause for postponement. 12S Although a defendant's need for post-
ponement to secure counsel may be good cause,126 timing is extremely 
important. 127 Thus, in one case, an eleventh hour request to change 
counsel was not good cause,128 and, in another case, the defendant's in-
sistence, on the date of trial, that appointed counsel was unprepared was 
not extraordinary cause. 129 The need by a defendant to visit a sick rela-
tive on the day of trial was also found not to constitute good cause. 130 
When a defendant backed out of a plea agreement on the day of 
trial, stating that he "wanted a jury trial and 'wanted it today,' " there 
was good cause for the state to seek postponement long enough to sum-
mon witnesses and to otherwise prepare for a trial on the merits.131 
Good cause was also found when a late motion for severance was granted 
at a point when only one defendant could be tried on schedule,132 when 
time was taken up on a pretrial suppression motion,133 and when good 
cause was found on request for postponement by a codefendant. 134 
Moreover, extraordinary cause may exist where removal is granted and 
123. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320,403 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1979). But see supra note 
17 and accompanying text (180 days used as benchmark under speedy trial 
analysis). 
124. See R. GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 42.0-48.3 (1983); Comment, supra note 45, at 47. In any event, it is 
best to put on some evidence regarding good cause, later to be held ordinary by the 
hearing judge, than to rely on a silent record. Loker, supra note 28, at 32. 
125. Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 121,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981), affd, 293 Md. 
97, 110,442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982); see also Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444 
(1984) (order for psychiatric evaluation). 
126. See Satchell v. State, 54 Md. App. 333, 338-40, 458A.2d 853, 856-57 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 42, 472 A.2d 457 (1984). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 626 (fac-
tors to be considered where delay producing conduct constitutionally protected). 
127. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 703-04, 407 A.2d 330, 334-35 (1979), 
rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421 A.2d 69 (1980). 
128. Meyer v. State, 49 Md. App. 300, 304, 431 A.2d 738, 740-41, cert. denied, 291 Md. 
782 (1981). 
129. State V. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 572-74,414 A.2d 240,241-42 (1980), rev'd on 
other grounds, 290 Md. 251,429 A.2d 1018 (1981). 
130. Brown V. State, 50 Md. App. 651, 653-54, 441 A.2d 354, 356 (1982). 
131. State V. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 267-68, 458 A.2d 491-92, affd, 299 Md. 79, 472 
A.2d 472 (1984). 
132. Calhoun V. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522,451 A.2d 146, 149-50 (1982), rev'd on other 
grounds, 249 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO 
SPEEDY TRIAL, standard 2.3(g) (severance as cause) (approved draft 1968), re-
printed in Rubine, supra note 31, at 810 n.75. 
133. State V. Harris, 299 Md. 63, 472 A.2d 467 (1984). 
134. McFadden V. State, 299 Md. 55, 472 A.2d 463 (1984). 
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the case cannot begin within the ISO-day period. 13S 
Similar examples of good cause appear in the literature. 136 For ex-
ample, the parties involvement in bona fide plea bargaining would be 
good cause for postponement on behalf of the state. 137 The same would 
be true when the defendant fails to comply with valid discovery re-
quests. 138 Also, because it is within prosecutorial discretion to try one 
codefendant before the other, good cause would exist to postpone the 
trial of the codefendant provided that there is good cause for severing the 
joint trial. 139 Postponement would also be justified when a defendant is 
deemed incompetent to stand trial. 140 
Another recurring fact pattern concerns the absence of key wit-
nesses or other competent evidence. The criteria for determining 
whether to postpone trial on this basis, under constitutional speedy trial 
. analysis prior to State v. Hicks,141 are identical to those applied under 
state prompt trial analysis. 142 These criteria are: (I) a reasonable expec-
tation of securing the witness or other evidence within a reasonable time; 
(2) the competency and materiality of the proffered evidence; (3) the abil-
ity to fairly try the case without the evidence; (4) the exercise of reason-
able diligence by the moving party prior to the trial date. 143 The same 
criteria would apply to a timely request for postponement because of the 
necessary convalescence ·of an injured victim or witness l44 or their un-
availability due to prescheduled vacation. 145 The unexcused failure of a 
party to secure the attendance of a material witness, however, would not 
constitute good cause because the public interest in prompt trial out-
135. Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83,426 A.2d 415, 422 (1981) (dictum). 
136. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 127, stan-
dard 2.3. 
137. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 633. 
138. Id. at 635. 
139. Id. at 637. 
140. Id. at 639; see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 
127, standard 2.3(a) (lack of competency as cause). 
141. 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979). 
142. Compare Bolden v. State, 44 Md. App. 643, 655-56,410 A.2d 1085, 1093-94 (pre-
Hicks), cert. denied, 287 Md. 750 (1980) with State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 
132,458 A.2d 442,449 (1983) (post-Hicks), aird on other grounds, 299 Md. 32,472 
A.2d 452 (1984). Note, however, that Bolden satisfied the extraordinary cause con-
dition and the Farinholt good cause condition. See supra text accompanying note 
122 (cases finding extraordinary cause remain persuasive). 
143. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134, 458 A.2d 442, 449 (1983), aird on 
other grounds, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); Bolden v. State, 44 Md. App. 643, 
655, 410 A.2d 1085, 1093-94 (extraordinary cause), cert. denied, 287 Md. 750 
(1980); Bethea V. State, 26 Md. App. 398, 400, 338 A.2d 390, 392 (1975) (extraordi-
nary cause); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 
127, standard 2.3(d)(i) (absence of material evidence). 
144. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 636, 640. 
145. See State V. Farinholt, 54 Md. App 124, 128,458 A.2d 442, 446 (1983) (vacationing 
witnesses' absence due to no fault of requesting party constitutes good cause), aird 
on other grounds, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
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weighs the need for such postponement. 146 Newly discovered evidence, 
however, may constitute good cause. 147 
Another source of litigation concerns whether the unavailability of 
judicial resources on the date of trial constitutes good cause for postpone-
ment. 148 Because the public interest is key to this issue, a substantial 
showing is required to support postponement. At first, the court of spe-
cial appeals was sympathethic only to "unavoidable" delays in the judi-
cial machinery where the reasons were supported by the record. 149 The 
court of appeals intervened, however, and held in State v. Fraizer,lso that 
an overcrowded docket situation does not, as a matter of law, preclude a 
change of trial date and may even justify a lengthy postponement. 151 
"When the [hearing judge] postpones a case beyond the ISO-day deadline 
because of court unavailability, there is a violation of [the prompt trial 
provisions] only if it is demonstrated that the change of trial date, or the 
period of time until a new trial date, represented a clear abuse of discre-
tion."lS2 The court cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions 
that held non-chronic court congestion to be good cause for postpone-
146. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 640; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-21 
(private need/public interest test for good cause under prompt trial provisions). 
147. Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 488, 474 A.2d 517, 521-22 (1984). 
148. E.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 passim, 470 A.2d 1269 passim, (1984); Larsen v. 
State, 55 Md. App. 135, 145-49,461 A.2d 543, 458-60 (1983), cerr. denied, 298 Md. 
708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 268-69, 458 A.2d 487, 
492 (1983) (dictum), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally ABA 
STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 127, standard 2.3(b) (lack 
of judicial resources must be due to exceptional circumstances to be excused); 
Poulous & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in 
Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 374-76 (1976); Rubine, supra note 
31, at 810 n.75; Comment, Speedy Trial & the Congested Trial Calendar, 1972 
UTAH L. REv. 268, 272-74 (1972). 
149. Compare Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 146-49, 461 A.2d 543, 548-50 (1983) 
(good cause shown on record), cerro denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984) with 
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232-34, 458 A.2d 480, 486-87 (1983) (record 
insufficient; good cause finding reversed), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. 
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). But cf Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. I, 
ll., 408 A.2d 102, 109 (1979) (constitutional speedy trial case in which delay caused 
by crowded docket charged against state), cert. denied, 286 Md. 755, cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 921 (1980). 
150. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). 
lSI. Id. at 461-62, 470 A.2d at 1289-90. 
152. Id.; see also State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472,474 A.2d 514 (1984) (dismissal denied on 
appeal because of failure of defendants to show abuse of discretion by trial judge in 
postponing beyond 180 days); Mahammitt v. State, 299 Md. 82, 472 A.2d 477 
(1984) (remanded to trial court for receipt of evidence on issue of waiver); Harper v. 
State, 299 Md. 75, 472 A.2d 473 (1984) (no abuse of discretion by trial judge for 
postponement to 2 days beyond 18O-day period due to unavailability of a court); 
Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 472 A.2d 470 (1984) (administrative judge did not abuse 
discretion by postponing beyond 18O-day period because of overcrowded docket); 
McFadden v. State, 299 Md. 55, 472 A.2d 463 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in 
requiring defendant to be tried beyond 180-day period when codefendants agreed to 
postponement and there was good cause not to sever). But see State v. Brown, 61 
Md. App. 411, 486 A.2d 813 (1985) (dismissal affirmed when case postponed to 173 
days beyond 180th day). 
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ment or delay, while holding chronic court congestion as inexcusable 
under their respective state statutes or rules of procedure. IS3 The court 
stated: 
The defendants' argument, that overcrowded dockets cannot as 
a matter of law constitute good cause for the postponement of a 
criminal case, is illogical. When overcrowded dockets are due 
in part to shortages of judges, prosecuting attorneys, public 
defenders, supporting personnel, or facilities, it must be 
remembered that public resources are not unlimited and there 
are many competing demands upon public funds. Moreover, 
even if there were no deficiencies in the number of judges, pros-
ecutors, public defenders, etc., overcrowded docket situations 
are sometimes inescapable. As earlier explained, the nature of 
any reasonable scheduling system and the inherent lack of cer-
tainty concerning the number of cases which will be fully tried 
or the length of trials, will on occasions lead to overcrowded 
dockets. I S4 
In deciding whether court congestion constitutes good cause, it is 
the duty of the state and the hearing judge to present as much evidence 
as possible with the request for postponement, "such as live witnesses 
and court records, as opposed to mere stipulated proffers or argu-
ment."ISS Thus, "[w]here the cause for postponement is the unavailabil-
ity of a judge, a jury or a courtroom, it might be well in the future for the 
state to have put into the record actual copies of this trial schedule, along 
with as much supporting detail as possible indicating the efforts being 
made by the court and the State's Attorney's Office to comply with [the 
prompt trial provisions]."ls6 
Like the early decisions of the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land,ls7 some other persuasive commentators place a premium on the 
interest of the public in prompt and effective trial when the issue is 
whether lack of judicial resources is good cause for postponement. ISS 
The American Bar Association Speedy Trial Guidelines are the least 
sympathetic, however, prescribing postponement for "exceptional cir-
cumstances" only, such as "a large scale riot or other mass public 
153. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 455-57, 470 A.2d 1269, 1287 (1984). 
154. Id. at 457, 470 A.2d at 1287. 
155. Loker, supra note 28, at 32. 
156. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 149,461 A.2d 543, 550 (1983), cert. denied, 298 
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984). 
157. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text (private need/public interest test for 
good cause under prompt trial provisions). 
158. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standard 
2.3(b) (lack of judicial resources must be due to exceptional circumstances); Com-
ment, supra note 148, at 272-74 (lack of judicial resources must be due to excep-
tional circumstances). 
1985] Prompt Criminal Trial Provisions 467 
disorder. "159 
From the preceeding illustrations, it is apparent that good cause de-
pends "on the facts and circumstances of each case"l60 and turns on the 
moving party's need for postponement weighed against the public inter-
est in swift and effective justice. 161 
C Approval of Postponement 
Once the hearing judge properly exercises the discretionary power 
vested in him by the prompt trial provisions and postpones the trial date 
beyond the 180-day limit, or once the trial begins within the l80-day 
period, the prompt trial provisions are no longer applicable;162 however, 
the defendant's rights are still guaranteed by the constitutional speedy 
trial provisions. 163 The trial judge may approve successive postpone-
ments beyond the 180-day period, albeit at the risk of offending the con-
stitutional speedy trial guarantee. l64 
Once the prompt trial provisions no longer apply, the public interest 
in swift justice and the sixth amendment require that postponements be 
granted only for the length of time necessary to alleviate the good cause 
shown. 165 Thus, "[i]n granting a postponement to a date beyond 180 
days, 'the administrative judge (as well as the prosecutor) is administra-
tively responsible for seeing that a [postponement], even when justified in 
purpose, is not extended unnecessarily' for purposes of a Barker v. Wingo 
159. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standard 2.3(b) 
and accompanying comments. 
160. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979). 
161. E.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449-63, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-90 (1984) (non-
chronic congestion does not preclude finding of good cause); Carter v. State, 54 Md. 
App. 220, 229-32, 458 A.2d 480, 484-86 (1983) (good cause requires extenuating 
circumstances and reasonable diligence), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. 
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984) (defense bears burden of proving abuse of 
discretion in granting good cause postponement); see also supra notes 116-21 and 
accompanying text (private need/public interest test for good cause under prompt 
trial provisions). 
162. State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63,472 A.2d 467 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 472 
A.2d 459 (1984); Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. 
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111-12, 
442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65, 458 A.2d 
487,490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally supra note 
45; infra Appendix (interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses). 
163. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63, 472 A.2d 467 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md. 
47,472 A.2d 459 (1984); Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); State 
v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 
264-65, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). See 
generally supra note 45; infra Appendix (interplay between prompt trial and speedy 
trial analyses). 
164. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129-30,458 A.2d 442, 446-47 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 32,40-41,472 A.2d 452,456 (1984). See generally supra note 45 (federal & 
state constitutional speedy trial rights); infra Appendix (interplay between prompt 
trial and speedy trial analyses). 
165. Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally supra note 45 
(interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses). 
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speedy trial analysis."166 As a result, it is incumbent on the hearing 
judge to attempt to make postponements to a date within the ISO-day 
period, or to state on the record his reasons for not doing SO.167 In decid-
ing the length of a postponement, the hearing judge should consider the 
purpose the postponement would serve to the moving party and the pub-
lic interest in swift justice. 168 
It is imperative that a postponement beyond the ISO-day period be 
granted by the county administrative judge or his designee only. As the 
court of appeals stated in State v. Frazier :169 
The major safeguard contemplated by the statute and rule. . . 
is the requirement that the administrative judge or his designee, 
rather than any judge, order the postponement. This is a logi-
cal safeguard, as it is the administrative judge who is responsi-
ble 'for the administration of the court,' who assigns trial 
judges, who 'supervises the assignment of actions for trial,' who 
supervises the court personnel involved in the assignment of 
cases, and who receives reports from such personne1. 170 
The court added a cautionary note in Farinholt v. State,171 however, that 
"any procedure adopted by a circuit court consisting of several trial 
judges, by which all trial judges are purportedly authorized to grant post-
ponements for purposes of [the prompt trial provisions], would not 
comply." 172 
Unlike a motion to dismiss, which will be discussed later, there is no 
formal or required method to secure postponement. 173 The Maryland 
courts, however, "have always required some record of proceedings of an 
administrative nature before they will reverse an exercise of judicial dis-
166. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133 n.5, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.5 (1983) (quoting 
Chance v. State, 45 Md. App. 521, 526,414 A.2d 535, 537 (1980», affd, 299 Md. 
32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 631 (trial date must 
not be postponed unnecessarily even when prompt trial sanction is waived); supra 
note 45 (interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses). 
167. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232, 458 A.2d 480, 486 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472,474 A.2d 514 (1984). See generally 
infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (preserving the record). 
168. See Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480, 484 (1983) (quoting ABA 
STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standards 12 and 13), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). 
169. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). 
170. Id. at 453-54, 470 A.2d at 1285 (footnotes omitted). 
171. 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1983). 
172. Id. at 37-38 n.2, 472 A.2d at 454 n.2. 
173. See, e.g., id. at 32 n.l, 472 A.2d at 453 n.l; State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318-19,403 
A.2d 356, 360-61 (1979); Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 118-19,425 A.2d 1374, 
1376-77 (1981), affd, 293 Md. 97, 111-12,442 A.2d 550, 558 (1982). But see State 
v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.6 (1983) (request for 
postponement should be in writing), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Ap-
proval may also be made sua sponte by the hearing judge. Goins v. State, 48 Md. 
App. 115, 118-19,425 A.2d 1374, 1376-77 (1979), affd, 293 Md. 97,442 A.2d 550 
(1982). 
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cretion, and of late more and more clarity and detail is prescribed."174 
Although approval may be granted informally, orders of postponement 
should be on the record and explicitly state the reasons therefor. 17S Post-
ponements made in chambers should also be recorded stenographi-
cally.176 Counsel should note with caution that a defendant, who may 
have more personal knowledge of the need for postponement than coun-
sel, may have a nonconstitutional right under the prompt trial provisions 
to be present during the motions hearing. 177 Postponement may be 
granted sua sponte, without request, hearing, or order of approval.l'8 
Although the trial judge plays a backstage role under the prompt trial 
provisions,179 he may not postpone a trial date beyond the ISO-day pe-
riod subject to later approval by the administrative judge, at least when 
such approval takes place after the expiration date. 180 
As to burden of proof, the prompt trial provisions require that good 
cause of postponement be shown 181 by the requesting party, who "bears 
the burden of demonstrating to the administrative judge or his designee 
that [the prompt trial] requirements are satisfied."182 As one commenta-
tor has noted, "[e]stablishing an adequate record means producing com-
petent evidence, such as live witnesses and court records, as opposed to 
mere unstipulated proffers or argument. . . . [Counsel] cannot afford 
to articulate arguments for or against a [postponement] in the judge's 
chambers, and forget to repeat their performance on the record."183 
174. Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 706, 407 A.2d 330, 335 (1979), rev'd on other 
grounds, 288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980). 
175. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.6 (1983), 
ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
176. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265 n.5, 458 A.2d 487, 490 n.5, ajJ'd, 299 Md. 72, 
472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text (preserv-
ing the record). 
177. Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 227-29, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980). 
178. Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110-12, 442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982). 
179. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 448-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984); see supra note 
161 and accompanying text (powers of trial judge in prompt trial context). 
180. Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984). 
181. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 233, 458 A.2d 480, 486 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). 
182. Id. at 231, 458 A.2d at 485. 
183. Loker, supra note 28, at 32. A complete record is also important to defense attor-
neys. Accordingly, the court of special appeals has remarked that 
[s]ince what constitutes [good] cause is a question within the limited dis-
cretion of an administrative judge to be decided on a case by case basis 
. . . it is appellant's burden to provide us with a satisfactorily endowed 
record indicative of an abuse of that discretion. 
Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 707, 407 A.2d 330, 336 (1979), rev'd on other 
grounds, 288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980). But see Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 
135,461 A.2d 543 (1983) (postponement due to lack of judicial resources upheld), 
cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984). In Larsen the court of special 
appeals stated that 
[w]here the cause for postponement is the unavailability of a judge, a jury 
or a court room, it might be well in the future for the State to have put 
into the record actual copies of the trial schedule, along with as much 
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Finally, it should be noted that the mere failure by a defendant to 
object to the state's request for postponement does not, as a matter of 
law, constitute a waiver of prompt trial protection. 184 In some circum-
stances, however, it may, and therefore, the defendant has a right to be 
present when and where the issue of postponement is discussed,185 even 
though such a hearing is not a "critical stage" requiring his presence. 186 
As both defense counsel and prosecuting attorneys have learned, the 
need to preserve the record for appellate review is crucial. 187 A good 
example is Hughes v. State,188 in which the defendant appealed his con-
viction on the ground that he was not present in the administrative 
judge's chambers during the consideration of his request for postpone-
ment. The court of special appeals stated that 
[we] are faced with a practical dilemma in the absence of a rec-
ord of what transpired in [the administrative judge's] chambers. 
We do not know whether [the administrative judge] declined to 
have the defendant present for security reasons, or whether his 
decision was arbitrary. We do not know what considerations 
were left before his honor in determining whether extraordi-
nary cause existed under the "facts and circumstances of this 
supporting detail as possible indicating the efforts being made by the court 
and the State's Attorney's Office to comply with Maryland Rule 746. 
Id. at 149, 461 A.2d at 550. "Appellate courts have always required some record of 
proceedings of an administrative nature before they will reverse an exercise of judi-
cial discretion, and oflate more and more clarity and detail is prescribed." Hughes 
v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 706,407 A.2d 330, 335 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 
288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980). Therefore, even proceedings in the chambers of 
the administrative judge should be recorded. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265 
n.5, 458 A.2d 487, 490 n.5 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). Failure 
to do so may cause problems on appeal. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 
698, 702-03, 407 A.2d 330, 334 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421 
A.2d 69 (1980). 
In a few cases, however, the court of appeals remanded for full evidentiary 
hearings under former Md. R.P. 871 (1977) to give the parties the benefit of the 
court's teachings in State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984) and 
Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). E.g., Mahammitt v. State, 299 
Md. 82, 472 A.2d 477 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 472 A.2d 459 (1984); 
Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23,472 A.2d 447 (1984). See generally infra Section 
V(B) (approval of postponement). The court in Frazier and Farinholt placed a 
heavy burden of proof upon the party challenging a good cause finding on a motion 
to dismiss. See infra Section VI (motion to dismiss). 
184. See, e.g., Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68,70-71,472 A.2d 470,471 (1984); State v. Fra-
zier, 298 Md. 422, 447 n.17, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282 n.17 (1984); Borgen v. State, 58 
Md. App. 61, 70, 472 A.2d 114, 118-19 (1984); Miller v. State, 53 Md. App. I, 6, 
452 A.2d 180, 183 (1982), cerL denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); State v. Lattisaw, 48 
Md. App. 20,27-29,425 A.2d 1051, 1054-55, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See 
generally infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial penalty). 
185. See Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 228-29, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980). 
186. Id. at 224-29, 421 A.2d at 74-76. 
187. See generally supra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving the record). 
188. 43 Md. App. 698, 407 A.2d 330 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421 
A.2d 69 (1980). 
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case." 189 
This decision must be compared with Larsen v. State,190 in which ap-
proval of a postponement for lack of judicial resources was upheld be-
cause of a carefully developed record that clearly showed good cause. 191 
Once good cause is found by the hearing judge and the trial date post-
poned, the party challenging the postponement must show that a finding 
was an abuse of discretion in a motion to dismiss. 192 
V. WAIVER OF PROMPT TRIAL PENALTY 
It is the penalty of dismissal that gives the prompt trial provisions 
their bite. As a general rule, a defendant's trial must begin within 180 
days from appearance;193 if it does not, all related charges must be dis-
missed with prejudice and forever, 194 and the defendant is absolved of his 
crimes. 195 
One question left open in Hicks is how and when a defendant may 
waive his right to the prompt trial penalty. The court in Hicks intimated 
that the waiver should be express, but an express waiver need not be 
"knowing and intelligent," as required for the relinquishment of consti-
tutional rightS. 196 The factual context of the few cases dealing with this 
issue can be argued to involve both express and implied waiver. For ex-
ample, prompt trial dismissal is inappropriate where defense counsel in-
advertently consents to a trial date beyond the 180-day period. 197 
Because, however, there must be good cause shown for the length of the 
189. [d. at 702-03, 407 A.2d at 334. 
, 190. 55 Md. App. 135, 461 A.2d 543 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 
(1984). See generally supra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving the 
record). 
191. Larsen, 55 Md. App. at 145-59, 461 A.2d at 548-50. See generally supra text accom-
panying notes 150-60 (lack of judicial resources as good cause). 
192. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 452, 470 A.2d 1269, 1285 (1984). See gener-
ally infra Section VI (motion to dismiss). 
193. MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746(a) (Supp. 1983); see State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. 
App. 124, 129, 458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). 
194. See State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651, 421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may 
not reindict defendant on charges previously dismissed due to lack of prompt trial). 
195. E.g., Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,6,472 A.2d 436,439 (1984); see Calhoun v. State, 
52 Md. App. 515,451 A.2d 146 (1983), rev'd, 299 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984): 
[T]he appellant urges that he be absolved of premeditated murder and all 
other crimes of which he has been found guilty, not because his constitu-
tional rights were violated, not because he was denied a fair trial, not be-
cause there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, but 
solely because the rubrics of a Court rule were not precisely followed. 
[d. at 521, 451 A.2d at 149. 
196. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 361-62, 369 (1979); State v. 
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20,27-29,425 A.2d 1051, 1054-55, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 
(1981). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 647; Loker, supra note 28, at 31. 
197. State V. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20,22-23,27,425 A.2d 1051, 1053-54, 1055-56, cert. 
denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981); see also State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356, 
369 (1979) (defendant or counsel may waive penalty); Williams V. State, SO Md. 
App. 255, 267, 437 A.2d 665, 672 (1981) (waiver by agreement of counsel), cert. 
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delay between postponement and trial,198 request for postponement by a 
defendant199 or failure by a defendant to otherwise object to postpone-
ment200 does not automatically constitute a waiver of prompt trial pen-
alty. But "when a defendant or his attorney, in the latter portion of the 
180-day period, seeks the postponement of a previously assigned trial 
date, and the newly assigned trial date is beyond 180 days, it could rea-
sonably be concluded that such defendant has sought a trial date in viola-
tion of the rule."201 Nor is the defendant entitled to dismissal when he 
attempts to indirectly "gain advantage" through his own dilatory de-
vices.202 Also, if the defendant fails to raise and move for dismissal on 
prompt203 or speedy204 trial grounds, appellate review on those issues is 
precluded.20s 
denied, 292 Md. 639 (1982); Joseph, supra note 6, at 631-32 (waiver by counsel). 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that: 
Defense counsel presumably can count to 180 as well as prosecutors; 
they know when they entered their appearances-when the clock began to 
tick-and they can figure out when the time under the Rule expires. 
These were not inexperienced counsel; according to the record, both attor-
neys had extensive background in the trial of criminal cases and were well 
aware of both the Rule and the interpretation given to it in Hicks. They 
both agreed to the June 9 date because it was convenient to them and, in 
the absence of any contrary indication, we assume was acceptable to their 
clients. It is not necessary for the clerk in the criminal assignment office to 
inform defense counsel with each telephone call of that which it is their job 
to know. Nor does it detract in the least from the reality of their consent 
to a particular trial date, or from the "expressness" of it, that they may be 
unaware that the date to which they agree is, in fact, beyond the 180-day 
period. To require dismissal of an indictment in such a case would be 
tantamount to doing precisely what the Court said was inappropriate-
permitting "the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule 
when he [through counsel] was a party to that violation." (Footnote 
omitted) 
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. at 28-29, 425 A.2d at 1055-56. 
198. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 447-48, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282-83 (1984). 
199. Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28-29, 472 A.2d 447, 450 (1984); Curley v. State, 
299 Md. 449, 452 n.3, 474 A.2d 502, 504 n.3 (1984). 
200. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 447 n.17, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282 n.17 (1984); Borgen v. 
State, 58 Md. App. 61, 71, 472 A.2d 114, 118-19, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 
A.2d 372 (1984). 
201. Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28-29, 472 A.2d 447, 450 (1984) (dictum). 
202. E.g., Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80,461 A.2d 21, 26-27 (1983), cert. de-
nied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 28-29, 
425 A.2d 1051, 1055-56, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See generally Joseph, 
supra note 6, at 624-35 (dilatory tactics). 
203. See Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984). 
204. Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l, 454 A.2d 879, 881 n.l (1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 
186, 194-95,447 A.2d 1272, 1277 (1982), affd, 296 Md. 670,464 A.2d 1028 (1983). 
205. See Md. R.P. 885 and 1085 (1977) (appellate review); see also Larsen v. State, 55 
Md. App. 135, 140, 461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983) (prompt trial issues properly raised 
and preserved for appellate review), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984). 
See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 621 (waiver by failure to move for dismissal); 
Loker, supra note 28, at 31 (waiver for failure to move for dismissal); infra Section 
VI (motion to dismiss under MD. R.P. 4-252). 
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Other examples of prompt trial waiver deal with pretrial motions by 
defendants,206 most of which would have also constituted good cause for 
postponement when requested by the state or the trial judge.207 For ex-
ample, a defendant's motions for severance2°8 and for removaP09 were 
both viewed as a waiver of the dismissal penalty because they extended 
the trial date beyond the ISO-day period.210 Similarly, a defendant's mo-
tion for an extension of time in which to elect the mode of trial he desired 
"was tantamount to seeking or expressly consenting to a violation of [the 
prompt trial provisions]."211 In another case, failure by the defense to 
object to the state's pretrial motion for postponement based on the avail-
ability of new evidence constituted a waiver of the dismissal penalty.212 
Other examples in the literature include waiver due to flight or unex-
cused absence of a defendant213 and refusal by a defendant to waive 
extradition. 214 
On the other hand, the imposition of an insanity defense may not 
constitute an express waiver to the prompt trial penalty.21S Nor does the 
defendant's insistence on his sixth amendment right to counsel on the 
206. For a discussion of where and when a pretrial motion may constitute waiver under 
prompt trial analysis, see Joseph, supra note 6, at 627-29. 
207. See Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83, 426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981) (dic-
tum); see also MD. R.P. 4-271(a) (power of the trial judge to request postponement). 
208. E.g., Calhoun v. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522, 451 A.2d 146, 150 (1982), rev'd on 
other grounds, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984). 
209. E.g., Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83, 426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981) 
(dictum). 
210. Calhoun v. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 521-22, 451 A.2d 146, 148-50, rev'd on other 
grounds, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984); Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-
83,426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981). 
211. Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983), cert. denied, 298 
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984). 
212. See Bolden V. State, 44 Md. App. 643, 656, 410 A.2d 1085, 1093 (dictum), cert. 
denied, 287 Md. 758 (1980); see also Miller V. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 6, 452 A.2d 
180, 183 (1982) (failure to object), cert. denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); c/ State V. 
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 21, 27, 425 A.2d 1051, 1053-54, 1055-56 (inadvertent 
consent to postponement), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). 
213. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 624-25. 
214. Id. at 627. But c/ Harper V. State, 299 Md. 75, 78, 472 A.2d 473, 475 (1984) 
(applicability of prompt trial provisions once Interstate Agreement on Detainers is 
invoked remains undecided). 
215. See Goins V. State, 293 Md. 97. 108.442 A.2d 550, 556 (1982). In Goins. the court 
of special appeals found that. although there was a prompt trial provision violation. 
dismissal was inappropriate because the delay in obtaining a mental health evalua-
tion was for the defendant's benefit. Id. at 106-07,442 A.2d at 555-56. Although 
the court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, it stated that 
[b]eing dilatory in raising an insanity defense obviously is not seeking or 
expressly consenting to a trial date in violation of § 591 and rule 746. At 
best, it might arguably constitute an implied consent to a postponement of 
the trial date, depending on the circumstances. However, in order to 
avoid such doubts and controversies, Hicks carefully limited this exception 
to the situation where the defendant seeks or expressly consents to a trial 
date in violation of the rule. 
Id. at 108, 442 A.2d at 556. 
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day of trial waive his prompt trial rights, or his insistence on the right to 
a prompt trial waive his right to counsel.216 Similarly, a defendant who 
waited 90 days after a postponement to move to dismiss on the day of 
trial did not waive his right to the prompt trial dismissal penalty.217 
Although delay beyond the ISO-day period due to bona fide plea 
negotiations would not constitute a waiver by the defendant,218 it may 
constitute good cause for the state to postpone.219 The acceptance of a 
guilty plea, however, "waives all procedural objections, constitutional or 
otherwise, and all non-jurisdictional defects."22o Moreover, once a de-
fendant agrees to a plea bargain, "obviat[ing] the need for trial alto-
gether," there is a de facto waiver of the prompt trial penalty, even if the 
plea is not consummated within the ISO-day period. 221 A defacto waiver 
analysis would apply equally to trial on charges for which the defendant 
received probation before judgment that he later violated.222 
There also is some confusion regarding the duty of the state to re-
quest postponement when it is difficult to foresee whether a defendant's 
dilatory conduct will constitute waiver, and there is no reason to believe 
that he will make a request for postponement.223 Because a defendant 
has no duty to bring himself to trial, the state should request a postpone-
ment for good cause224 and be put in a position to argue, in the event that 
the defendant moves to dismiss, that the defendant waived the prompt 
trial penalty.22s One collateral result of such a strategy is that, as a prac-
tical matter, a finding of good cause is more likely to be upheld on ap-
peal226 than is a finding of waiver227 or of improper dismissal.228 If the 
216. Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232,443 A.2d 103 (1982). 
217. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 139,461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983), cert. denied, 298 
Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984). 
218. Cf Joseph, supra note 6, at 633. 
219. See generally supra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement). 
220. Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 183,426 A.2d 415, 423 (1981) (quoting English 
v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 443, 298 A.2d 464, 467 (1973». 
221. Id. at 182-83, 426 A.2d at 422-23. 
222. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 641. 
223. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982); Goins v. 
State, 293 Md. 97, 112,442 A.2d 550, 558 (1982). 
224. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984); Goins v. State, 48 Md. 
App. 115, 120-21,425 A.2d 1374, 1377-78, affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982). 
225. "Introduction of common law waiver analysis, with its implicit invitation to result 
manipulation through fact characterization, not only stimulates litigation, but also 
substantively detracts from the effectiveness of [prompt trial] statutes and rules." 
Joseph, supra note 6, at 647. See generally infra note 235 (strategy under MD. R.P. 
4-252). 
226. See State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984); State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 
472 A.2d 476 (1984); Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 472 A.2d 470 (1984) (per curiam); 
State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59,472 A.2d 465 (1984) (per curiam); State v. Frazier, 
298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). 
227. See supra note 225 and accompanying text; see, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 
124, 134-35,458 A.2d 442, 449-50 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); 
Miller v. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 5-6,452 A.2d 180, 182-83 (1982), cert. denied, 295 
Md. 302 (1982). 
228. Compare State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 421 A.2d 98 (1980) (dismissal of 
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state knocks the case out of the 180-day period with a postponement for 
good cause motion, it may only have to deal with the more liberal consti-
tutional speedy trial right, and may argue good cause and prompt and 
speedy trial waiver against a motion to dismiss. If, on the other hand, 
the state's postponement request is denied and, as a result, the denial 
becomes non-reviewable, the state may still argue waiver as a defense to 
the motion to dismiss. This latter argument, of course, would have been 
available even if the state had not requested a postponement in the first 
place. 
Similarly, it was not clear at first from the reported decisions 
whether a defendant has any obligation to show good cause when re-
questing a postponement to beyond the 180-day period, or whether such 
a request constitutes "seeking" a violation of the prompt trial provisions, 
resulting in waiver of the penalty as a matter oflaw.229 A fair reading of 
the prompt trial provisions dictates that all involved must show good 
cause when effecting any prompt trial postponement.230 This reading is 
second case brought to circumvent 18O-day rule upheld) with State v. Farinholt, 54 
Md. App. 124,458 A.2d 442 (1983) (dismissal reversed on showing of waiver), affd, 
299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984) and State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 425 A.2d 
1051 (dismissal reversed on showing of waiver), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981); cf 
Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 137-39,461 A.2d 543, 544-45 (1983), cerro denied, 
298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984) (grant of postponement to allow state to respond 
to motion to dismiss is within ordinary discretion of court). 
229. See State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979). Compare Goins V. 
State, 48 Md. App. 115, 119-21,425 A.2d 1374, 1377-78 (1981) (good cause found), 
affd on other grounds, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982) with State V. Lattisaw, 48 
Md. App. 20, 27-29, 425 A.2d 1051, 1055-56 (agreement by counsel to trial date 
beyond 180-day period considered waiver), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See 
a/so supra text accompanying notes 190-91 (waiver where defendant or counsel 
"seek" postponement). 
230. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983); MD. 
R.P. 4-271; see, e.g., State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318,403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) 
(prompt trial provisions bind prosecution and defense alike); see also Hughes V. 
State, 288 Md. 216, 229, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980) (defendant must show good 
cause to justify a continuance beyond 180 days); State V. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 
124, 134-35, 458 A.2d 442, 447-49 (1983) (the defendant or the state may request 
postponement, or the court may raise the issue sua sponte), affd, 299 Md. 32, 472 
A.2d 452 (1984); Goins V. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 119,425 A.2d 1374, 1377 (1981), 
affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982) (defendant or state must show good cause to 
justify continuance past 180 days). But see State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 
A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (consent to postponement by defendant in violation of prompt 
trial provisions waives penalty); but see also Miller V. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 5-6,452 
A.2d 180, 182-83 (1982) (waiver by failure to object to placement of case on move 
list), cert. denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); State V. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 28, 29, 
425 A.2d 1051, 1054, 1055-56 (waiver need not be express), cerro denied, 290 Md. 
717 (1981). Because the prompt trial provisions were enacted "not solely to imple-
ment the defendant's right to a speedy trial, which is already constitutionally pro-
tected, but to protect society from the harms of unnecessarily delayed criminal 
trials," Carter V. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 226, 458 A.2d 480, 483 (1983), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. State V. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984), the provi-
sions "hold [defendants'] feet to the fire," Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. at 27, 425 A.2d at 
1055, and the better rule is to require them to meet the good cause condition also. 
[d. See generally supra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement). 
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reinforced by the Hicks court's obsession with the public interest in 
prompt and efficient disposition of criminal cases.231 
VI. MOTION TO DISMISS: MARYLAND RULE 4-252 
Once a defendant's trial date is improperly postponed beyond the 
ISO-day period, the defendant must file a motion to dismiss that complies 
with ~aryland Rule 4-252.232 Procedurally, "[i]f a defendant files a 
timely, written motion to dismiss on the date of trial, it then becomes the 
option of the State to argue the motion at that time or to request a post-
ponement 'to prepare its justification for whatever is alleged and prayed 
by the [defendant's] motion to dismiss.' "233 Although Maryland Rule 4-
252(c) and (d) contemplate a written motion to dismiss filed prior to 
trial, the court of appeals has held, under former Rule 736, that the trial 
judge has wide discretion and may entertain a motion made orally on the 
day of trial.234 
231. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316-18, 403 A.2d 356, 359-60 (1979); see State v. 
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 27, 
425 A.2d 1051, 1055 (dictum), cerL denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). 
232. MD. RP. 4-252(c)-(f) governs motions to dismiss for violations of defendants' 
rights to prompt trial as well as speedy trial, and reads in pertinent part: 
c. Other Motions.-A motion asserting failure of the charging document 
to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised and 
determined at any time. Any other defense, objection, or request capable 
of determination before trial without trial of the general issue, shall be 
raised by motion filed at any time before trial. 
d. Content.-A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in writing 
unless the court otherwise directs, shall state the grounds upon which it is 
made, and shall set forth the relief sought. A motion alleging an illegal 
source of information as the basis for probable cause must be supported by 
precise and specific factual averments. Every motion shall contain or be 
accompanied by a statement of points and citation of authorities. 
e. Response.-A response, if made, shall be filed within 15 days after 
service of the motion and contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
points and citation of authorities. 
f. Determination.-Motions filed pursuant to this Rule shall be deter-
mined before trial and, to the extent practicable, before the day of trial, 
except that the court may defer until after trial its determination of a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to obtain a speedy trial. If factual issues are 
involved in determining the motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record. 
Implicit in this requirement is an opportunity for the state to prepare its opposition 
within the time limits prescribed by the Rule. Carey v. State, 54 Md. App. 448, 449-
51,458 A.2d 90, 91-92 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 17, 21 n.2, 472 A.2d 444, 446 n.2 
(1984). See infra text accompanying note 233 (option of state to prepare response 
within 15 days). 
233. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 139, 461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983) (quoting Pen-
nington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538,542 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 
472 A.2d 447 (1984», cerL denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); see also supra 
note 232 (state's opportunity to prepare opposition to motion). 
234. Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 71, 472 A.2d 470,471 (1984); Pennington v. State, 299 
Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447, 449-50 (1984); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17, 20-21, 472 
A.2d 444, 446 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 436-37 n.ll, 470 A.2d 1269, 
1277 n.ll (1984). 
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As to substance, the allegations of the defendant and the response by 
the state must be articulate and organized and must distinguish between 
issues of good cause, waiver, and constitutional speedy triaJ.23S When 
dealing with a motion to dismiss for a prompt trial violation, the only 
relevant postponement is that which caused the trial date to be post-
poned beyond the ISO-day period.236 This singular focus is important 
because it differs from the constitutional speedy trial analysis on the total 
length of delay, and it involves no balancing test or calculations of time 
chargeable to each party, as does the constitutional provision.'237 Thus, it 
235. See Md. R.P. 736(e) (1977); MD. R.P. 4-252(d), (e). In State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. 
App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981), the court of special 
appeals described one attempt by the state to oppose a motion to dismiss filed that 
same morning: 
The State defended these motions [to dismiss] on the ground that, by 
consenting to the trial date of June 9, [defendants], through their counsel, 
were in part responsible for the violation of the Rule. A precise theory 
was not clearly articulated. At one point, the State's Attorney seemed to 
apply the Constitutional balancing test, allocating certain periods of time 
to the State and other periods to the defense; intermingled with this were 
suggestions of waiver or the existence of "good cause" for the violation of 
the [provisions]. 
[d. at 22-23, 425 A.2d at 1052-53; cf. Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. I, 5 n.2, 472 A.2d 
436, 438 n.2 (1984) (confusion of prompt trial with constitutional speedy trial by 
court). As a part of general strategy, defense counsel should file an early demand 
for a speedy trial, since the defendant's assertion of his constitutional speedy trial 
right is an important factor in the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. See Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S 514, 530-33 (1972). Although there is no demand requirement 
under the prompt trial provisions, a defendant may file such a demand. See Pen-
nington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 544, 454 A.2d 879, 882 (1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 299 Md. 23,472 A.2d 447 (1984). The defendant may then move to dis-
miss on both grounds in order to preserve both issues for possible appellate review. 
See, e.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 53 n.3, 472 A.2d 459, 462-63 n.3 (1984); 
Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 137, 461 A.2d 543, 544 (1983), cert. denied, 298 
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 135-36, 458 
A.2d 442, 450 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally Note, 
supra note 34, at 489-92 (prompt v. speedy trial criteria); supra note 183 (preserving 
the record). Conversely, the state, having received a postponement early on, may 
then argue both good cause and waiver against a motion to dismiss. See generally 
supra text accompanying notes 224-31 (prompt trial strategy). 
236. See, e.g., Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 
Md. 422, 427-28, 470 A.2d 1269, 1272 (1984). 
237. See, e.g., Satchell v. State, 299 Md. 42, 45-46, 472 A.2d 457, 458 (1984); Goins v. 
State, 293 Md. 97, 105, 112,442 A.2d 550, 554, 558 (1982); Monge v. State, 55 Md. 
App. 72, 80, 461 A.2d 21, 27 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 
(1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487,490, affd, 299 Md. 72, 
472 A.2d 472 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 130,458 A.2d 442, 447 
(1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). In Goins v. State, 293 Md. 197,442 
A.2d 550 (1982), both the administrative judge and the court of special appeals 
applied a " 'balancing test' to determine which side was responsible for the delay 
and which side benefitted from the delay." [d. at 105,442 A.2d at 554. The court 
of appeals affirmed, but for different reasons, stating that 
[the prompt trial provisions] contain their own mechanism for dealing 
with a case where the defendant, by some dilatory action, has made it 
virtually impossible to try a criminal case within the 180-day time limit. 
That mechanism is a motion, supported by good cause, by the State or the 
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is incorrect to tally up how much time is to be assessed each side and 
grant dismissal if the state has delayed over 180 days.238 Once a trial 
date is postponed beyond the period for good cause shown, the prompt 
trial provisions no longer apply, and the defendant's rights are measured 
only by constitutional speedy trial requirements.239 The speedy trial is-
sue should also be asserted in the motion to dismiss for decision at trial 
and to preserve the issue for possible appellate review.240 Finally, denial 
of a motion to dismiss may only be appealed after final judgment.241 If, 
however, the granting of the motion results in dismissal of the charges 
the state may appeal immediately.242 
In deciding a motion to dismiss under prompt trial analysis, the trial 
judge must address three basic issues: (1) whether the trial date has been 
postponed beyond the 180-day period; and, if so, (2) whether good cause 
was found by the hearing judge; and, if not, (3) whether the defendant 
waived his right to the dismissal penalty. As the court of appeals set out 
in State v. Fraizer :243 
Consequently, with regard to the postponement of a criminal 
trial for good cause, it is the administrative judge's exercise of 
judgment with which those later reviewing the matter are con-
cerned. Another nisi prius judge, ruling on a motion to dismiss 
for an alleged violation of §591 and Rule 746, has been de-
prived of the authority to exercise independent judgment con-
cerning good cause for postponement.244 . . . . This is not to 
say that a trial judge has no role when there is a motion to 
dismiss based upon an asserted violation of §591 and Rule 746. 
As the Hicks and Goins cases make clear, a trial judge enter-
taining such a motion must ordinarily grant it if the case was 
not tried within 180 days and if the trial was not postponed 
beyond that deadline in accordance with the statute and rule. 
But in making this determination, when reviewing a postpone-
court itself for a postponement of the trial date, so long as the motion is 
granted or approved by the county administrative judge. 
!d. at 112, 442 A.2d at 558. 
238. See, e.g., Goins, 293 Md. at 105,442 A.2d at 554; Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472 
A.2d 436,438 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487,490, 
affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 128, 
458 A.2d 442, 446 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984) (improper compu-
tation by court). 
239. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay between prompt and speedy 
trial rights issue). 
240. See, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 135-36,458 A.2d 442 (1983), affd, 
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l, 
454 A.2d 879, 881 n.1 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 
(1984); see also supra note 235 and accompanying text (prompt trial strategy). 
241. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 12-301 (Repl. Vol. 1984). 
242. See id. at § 12-302(i). See generally Loker, supra note 28, at 31-32 (prompt trial 
strategy for prosecution). 
243. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984). 
244. Id. at 450, 470 A.2d at 1284. 
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ment beyond the 180-day deadline ordered by the administra-
tive judge, deference must be accorded the judgment of the 
administrative judge and those assignment personnel acting 
under his supervision. We hold, therefore, as follows: with re-
gard to both components of the "good cause" requirement in 
§59l and Rule 746, the trial judge (as well as an appellate 
court) shall not find an absence of good cause unless the de-
fendant meets the burden of demonstrating either a clear abu~e 
of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law.24S 
.... Finally, the party challenging the discretionary ruling 
on a motion for a postponement has the burden of demonstrat-
ing a clear abuse of discretion.246 
VII. CONCLUSION 
479 
Under the Maryland prompt trial provisions, a criminal defendant 
charged in the circuit court must be brought to trial within 180 days of 
his initial appearance or the charges must be dismissed with prejudice. 
Two exceptions to this rule are good cause shown for postponement be-
yond the l80-day period, and waiver of dismissal by defendant or coun-
sel. A distillation of State v. Hicks, and the decisions following it, reveal 
certain mechanics of the provisions with which practitioners must famil-
iarize themselves when handling prompt trial issues. These include ap-
plicability of the provisions, setting the initial trial date, postponement of 
the trial date, the dismissal penalty and waiver thereof, and making or 
opposing a motion to dismiss. Once these mechanics are understood, the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the prompt trial provisions 
may be approached in a more organized manner by both bench and bar. 
245. Id. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286. 
246. Id. at 452, 470 A.2d at 1285. 

